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    Abstract—Future wireless networks will progressively displace 
service provisioning towards the edge to accommodate increasing 
growth in traffic. This paradigm shift calls for smart policies to 
efficiently share network resources and ensure service delivery. 
In this paper, we consider a cognitive dynamic network 
architecture (CDNA) where primary users (PUs) are rewarded 
for sharing their connectivities and acting as access points for 
secondary users (SUs). CDNA creates opportunities for capacity 
increase by network-wide harvesting of unused data plans and 
spectrum from different operators. Different policies for data and 
spectrum trading are presented based on centralized, hybrid and 
distributed schemes involving primary operator (PO), secondary 
operator (SO) and their respective end users. In these schemes, 
PO and SO progressively delegate trading to their end users and 
adopt more flexible cooperation agreements to reduce 
computational time and track available resources dynamically. A 
novel matching-with-pricing algorithm is presented to enable self-
organized SU-PU associations, channel allocation and pricing for 
data and spectrum with low computational complexity. Since 
connectivity is provided by the actual users, the success of the 
underlying collaborative market relies on the trustworthiness of 
the connections. A behavioral-based access control mechanism is 
developed to incentivize/penalize honest/dishonest behavior and 
create a trusted collaborative network. Numerical results show 
that the computational time of the hybrid scheme is one order of 
magnitude faster than the benchmark centralized scheme and 
that the matching algorithm reconfigures the network up to three 
orders of magnitude faster than in the centralized scheme.  
 
Index Terms—Cognitive dynamic network, data trading, 
spectrum trading, pricing policies, QoS, trust. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid growth of advanced wireless devices and services 
is exacerbating the problem of spectrum scarcity and posing 
potential challenges for mobile operators, especially in terms 
of quality of service (QoS) provisioning [1]. Existing solutions 
for coping with traffic demand focus on investing in additional 
fixed infrastructure, which is costly from an environment and 
network perspective [2]. Besides, these solutions rely on 
conventional cellular infrastructure design built to satisfy peak 
rates and ignore the dynamic traffic fluctuations that render a 
significant part of this infrastructure unutilized in space and 
time. Despite densification efforts to increase spectrum 
reusability, the licensed spectrum continues to be scarce and its 
efficient usage will soon approach the theoretical limits [2]. 
Recently, a new generation of dynamic network 
architectures (DNAs) has emerged in which users share their 
connectivities and act as access points for other users in their 
vicinity, augmenting network capacity [3]-[5]. The high 
density of users’ terminals provides many opportunities for 
connectivity and network traffic offloading without additional 
infrastructure cost. Integrating cognitive capabilities into the 
DNA for spectrum harvesting will facilitate access to 
additional unused spectrum, both temporally and spatially, to 
meet growing spectrum demand [3]. In addition, the diversity 
of data plans1 provides users with different service capabilities 
as potential access points. If users with high capabilities 
outsource these to others (by acting as access points) at critical 
network operational times, overall network performance can 
be improved and harvested spectrum can be more efficiently 
utilized via an increase in frequency reuse. Furthermore, 
network operators could intelligently share their residual 
spectrum resource and service capabilities to ensure service 
delivery and thus, increase their revenue and create new 
business opportunities. These opportunities result from trading 
harvested data and spectrum between users and operators. 
In this paper, we explore business opportunities in data and 
spectrum harvesting created by a cognitive dynamic network 
architecture (CDNA) where primary users (PUs) share their 
connectivities with secondary users (SUs) for some reward. In 
CDNA, each SU connects through its preferred PU using the 
harvested spectrum. The selected PU shares its unused data 
and acts as an access point for SU transmissions in return for a 
reward. CDNA creates a new collaborative market for data and 
spectrum trading and opportunities for revenue sharing among 
the parties involved (primary operator [PO], secondary 
operator [SO] and their respective end users). A framework for 
data and spectrum trading optimization is developed to 
maximize the utility of each party and satisfy the QoS for SUs. 
Three approaches are considered: centralized, hybrid and 
distributed. Each incurs different levels of coordination and 
revenue sharing. In the centralized approach, the SO performs 
data and spectrum trading with the PO to satisfy the demands 
of SUs. The PO then rewards PUs willing to serve as access 
points for SU traffic. In the hybrid scheme, the SO and PO 
trade the spectrum but delegate data trading to PUs and SUs. 
PUs benefit directly from this trading as an incentive to share 
their resources. Finally, in the distributed scheme, the SO and 
PO negotiate a revenue share for their cooperation and let PUs 
and SUs trade the data and spectrum.  
To fully exploit the potentials of this architecture and make 
it highly adaptive to traffic dynamics, we aim to develop 
distributed mechanisms for data and spectrum trading with low 
computational complexity. The traffic dynamics result from 
the activity of the SUs and PUs, creating resource-sharing 
 
1 The data plan limits the amount of data transferred over the network for 
the duration of the plan. We will use data plan trading and data trading 
interchangeably through the paper. 
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opportunities. In [4], Shafigh et al. present a genetic algorithm 
for topology reconfiguration in DNA without cognitive 
capabilities and show that the optimum topology can track 
network dynamics and, thus, satisfy users’ QoS requirements. 
However, genetic algorithms are centralized in nature and in 
our CDNA, both the PO and SO participate in resource 
allocation. Game theory is a powerful tool for performing 
distributed resource allocation [6], [7]. In [8] the spectrum-
sharing problem between a set of device to device (D2D) pairs 
and multiple co-located cellular networks is formulated as a 
Bayesian non-transferable utility overlapping coalition 
formation game. Some works have applied matching theory to 
cognitive networks to solve the channel allocation problem [9], 
[10]. Matching theory seems an attractive framework for 
resource allocation in cognitive networks where two sets of 
agents (PUs and SUs) can be matched according to their 
preferences [35]. Nevertheless, existing works in this area have 
some limitations. In [9], a one-to-one stable matching game is 
considered where the utilities of the SUs and PUs are chosen 
to be identical because the SUs cannot obtain the performance 
measures of the PUs. In [10] the channel assignment problem 
is formulated as a many-to-one matching game under the 
limitation that each primary channel can only be assigned to 
one SU. Our work overcomes these limitations since CDNA 
facilitates operator cooperation, and we incorporate pricing 
into the matching decision to facilitate self-organized data and 
spectrum trading among multiple SUs and PUs. 
Since connectivity opportunities are offered by users in 
CDNA, to ensure widespread adoption, it is crucial to develop 
trust mechanisms that encourage trustworthy connections. In 
cognitive networks, trust mechanisms have been proposed for 
collaborative spectrum sensing under report falsifying attacks 
[11], [12]. A user-selection method based on reinforcement 
learning is presented in [11] to select reliable SUs. Qin et al. 
[12] proposed a trust-based model and developed a weighted 
sensing aggregation scheme to remove attackers from the 
decision-making process. However, a holistic design for a trust 
management system is missing due to a lack of network 
architecture. 
Our major contributions are summarized as follows: 
 A framework for data and spectrum trading optimization 
which involves a PO, a SO and their respective end users. We 
develop three schemes—centralized, hybrid and distributed—
with new policies for revenue sharing, and derive the optimal 
behavior of the parties involved. These schemes present 
different performance and complexity tradeoffs to suit 
heterogeneous traffic loads and revenue expectations.  
 A matching theory based algorithm with pricing to solve 
the SU-PU association for data and spectrum trading, spectrum 
allocation and pricing. The algorithm is based on a many-to-
one matching game where multiple SUs are assigned to a PU 
that satisfies their QoS requirements. Pricing is incorporated 
into the matching as the price of resources is a decisive 
criterion for SU-PU association. Positive and negative 
externalities are considered due to changes in demand and 
supply, which have an impact on data and spectrum 
availability and, thus, on price.  
 A two-stage deterrence-based trust mechanism which 
encompasses partially distributed (via local physical 
interactions) and partially centralized (via operators’ 
involvement) trust management. Since perception of trust 
varies among users, we model behavioral aspects and their 
impact on trust, and define a behavioral-based access control 
scheme that encourages consistent behavior through 
punishment (of misbehaved users) and reward (of well-
behaved users). By exploring the properties of trust, we also 
propose a fully distributed trust mechanism for autonomous 
evaluation of trust by users.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related 
work is reviewed in Section II. The network model is 
discussed in Section III. The data and spectrum trading 
framework is given in Section IV. New matching algorithms 
are developed in Section V. The trust relationship model is 
presented in Section VI. Performance evaluation is given in 
Section VII. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Novel architectures for cognitive networks based on D2D 
[8], [13], small cells [14], [15] and multi-hop communications 
[16], [17] have been proposed to further increase spectrum 
efficiency. D2D spectrum sharing is intended to offload traffic 
from the cellular infrastructure when source and destinations 
are close to each other [13]. Cognitive capabilities can be 
utilized to mitigate intercell interference between a macrocell 
and the small cells to deploy heterogeneous spectrum-efficient 
networks [15]. However, the introduction of a fixed 
infrastructure significantly increases overall energy 
consumption and infrastructure cost. Enabling multi-hop 
communication in cognitive networks can further increase 
coverage and spectrum efficiency by exploiting locally 
available channels and support dynamic traffic distributions 
without additional infrastructure costs [16]. The importance of 
backup channels and relaying incentives to increase link 
reliability and robustness in multi-hop cognitive networks is 
addressed in [18].  
Due to the enormous economic value of spectrum, spectrum 
trading has attracted a lot of interest lately on the 
aforementioned architectures [18]-[23]. In [19], repeated 
auctions in the uplink of a secondary cell are proposed for the 
allocation of primary channels to the SUs. Spectrum auctions 
are studied in [20] for energy-efficient channel assignment. 
Other approaches consider Stackelberg game [22] or contract 
theory [23] for channel allocation and pricing. However, the 
limitations of the previous architectures in terms of efficient 
spectrum use also limit the benefits of spectrum trading. 
Moreover, the major concern in spectrum trading to date has 
been spectrum access rather than service delivery. This paper 
fills this gap by defining joint data and spectrum trading 
policies in a trusted CDNA which provides operator support 
for such trading.  
CDNA encompasses the advantages of the previous 
architectures. First, it relieves congestion in the secondary 
network by offloading traffic through available PUs. Second, it 
enables efficient use of data and spectrum by reusing available 
channels temporally and spatially. Third, in contrast to multi-
hop cognitive networks, where routes are formed by SUs 
relaying traffic through primary channels, in our system data is 
forwarded by PUs through the primary network, which reduces 
reliability concerns related to multi-hop cognitive 
transmissions to the first hop (SU-PU link). 
III. NETWORK MODEL 
A. System Architecture for Data and Spectrum Trading 
We consider the Cognitive Dynamic Network Architecture 
(CDNA) shown in Fig. 1 that consists of a PO that incentivizes 
certain PUs to act as access points for SUs in their vicinity. 
The SO has its own spectrum bands, although they are 
potentially congested, and cannot satisfy the QoS requirements 
of its SUs. Thus, the SO negotiates the conditions for data and 
spectrum trading with the PO as illustrated in Fig. 1a. 
Depending on the existing demand, the PO will encourage a 
set of PUs to share their connectivities with the SUs by 
offering them a reward. This reward is in return for the PO’s 
benefit obtained when sharing its available data and spectrum 
with the SO. The SO will allocate the traded channels and PUs 
to satisfy SU demands. Thus, in CDNA the connectivity is 
provided by PUs using available channels in the primary 
network as shown in Fig. 1b. Since the infrastructure is 
provided by the PO, we omit the SO in the plot. The success of 
this collaborative market relies on the trustworthiness of the 
connections which will be elaborated in Section VI.  
 Suppose that PUs  = {1, 2, …, M} operate in the set of 
licensed spectrum bands  = {1, 2, …, B}, which have an 
identical bandwidth of size equal to 1. The SUs  = {1, 2, …, 
N} are equipped with one radio that can be tuned into any 
available frequency band for packet delivery, i.e., a cognitive 
radio user can only work on one of the available bands at a 
time. The availability of the frequency bands varies in time 
and space as these bands may be occupied by PU 
transmissions.  
The SO harvests licensed spectrum bands, purchases 
spectrum bands for SU links at different locations, and 
conducts channel allocation for SU links. The SUs can use the 
purchased licensed bands and transmit to the available PUs 
when the primary services are not on, but have to stop using 
them when primary services become active. This approach is 
commonly employed in spectrum trading problems to address 
the interaction between PUs and SUs as a negotiation process 
[16]. In CDNA, this is enforced by the PO and SO that 
coordinate the allocation of channels and PUs for the 
transmission of SUs. Thus, the interference between PUs and 
SUs can be avoided. The cooperation agreement between the 
PO and SO relies on resource pricing and revenue sharing to 
distribute the benefits of this cooperation. This is a reasonable 
assumption as it might be based on an agreement between 
companies, in which, in turn, the PO would incentivize the 
PUs to participate. Since the available resources (data and 
spectrum) are limited, pricing is used to allocate resources 
fairly to SUs with respect to their initial purchased data plan. 
The notation used in the paper is summarized in Table I.  
B. Probability Model for Primary Services 
We model the activity of primary services since SU 
transmission on band b ∈  will depend on the availability of 
the band. As shown in [24]-[26], primary service traffic can be 
modeled as a two state ON-OFF process, where ON means 
that the band is occupied by primary services and OFF means 
that it is available for opportunistic access by SUs. Let us 
denote the probability that band b at link lij is in an OFF state 
by b
ija  and the probability that band b at link lij is in an ON 
state by (1 )bija . 
 
 
  
 
Fig. 1. Cognitive Dynamic Network Architecture 
a) Data and Spectrum Trading; b) PU-SU association; c) Data Forwarding   
Table I. Notation 
N, M, B Total number of SUs, PUs and channels 
b
ija
 Availability probability of channel b at link lij 
cij, cmin,i Capacity of the link lij, minimum capacity required by SU i  
τij, τmin,i Connectivity / minimum connectivity duration for SU i 
Qoi, Qoj Initial data volume for SU i and PU j 
,b bij ijx t
 SU i transmits / trades with PU j in channel b  
ρij Trustworthiness of link lij 
rij Reward received by PU j for forwarding the data of SU i 
η, σ, ψ 
Revenue share in the primary network, secondary network, 
revenue share among PO and SO 
ej , ξj Energy cost of PU j, Reliability of PU j 
US, UP Utility of SO and PO 
,b bij jiU V
 Utility of SU / PU when SU i transmits to PU j in channel b 
χ, δ Convergence error / Time index 
, ,b bij ij ijp    
Price per unit of data transmitted on channel b in link lij, 
price per available channel b, data price between i and j 
dir
ijO
, ind
ijO
 SU i own direct experience and indirect experience with j 
 
C. Link Capacity and Data Volume 
Following a widely used model [27], the power propagation 
gain from SU i ∈  to PU j ∈  is 
ij ijg d
   , where β is an 
antenna-related parameter, α is the path loss factor, and dij is 
the distance between the two nodes. Let us assume that the 
transmission power at SU i is Pi, and that data transmission is 
successful only when the received power exceeds a threshold 
T
thP , i.e., 
T
i ij thP g P  .  Thus, we can obtain the transmission 
range of the SU i as 1/( / )T Ti i thR P P
  . Similarly, suppose 
that the received interference at PU j can be ignored only when 
its power is less  than a  threshold  T
thP . The interference range 
of  PU  j  can  therefore  be  obtained  as 1/( / )I Ij k thR P P
  , 
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Fig. 2. Data and spectrum trading policies: 
                              a) Centralized scheme                                                 b) Hybrid scheme                                                          c) Distributed scheme 
where k ∈  is an adjacent interfering SU. According to the 
Shannon-Hartley theorem, if SU i transmits data to PU j using 
available band b, the link capacity will be 
 2log 1 /ij i ijc P g                                (1) 
where the bandwidth of band b (Wb = W = 1) and γ is the 
Gaussian noise power at PU j. In the following section we will 
address the transmission constraints to avoid interference. 
Let us assume that SU i and PU j have a contract with their 
operator for data volumes Qoi and Qoj, respectively. By using 
the Shannon capacity model, the data volume transmitted 
between SU i and PU j is denoted as  
ij ij ijQ c                                       (2) 
which varies with the duration of the connection τij. The 
framework for data and spectrum trading is elaborated in the 
sequel. 
IV. DATA AND SPECTRUM TRADING FRAMEWORK DESIGN 
A. Interference Constraints and Trading Topology 
The available bands will be allocated for data transmission 
to avoid interference between different links. We denote 
1,  if  can transmit data to  on band 
0,  otherwise
b
ij
i j b
x

 

          (3) 
Let i    denote the set of available licensed bands at SU i 
∈ . We define the set of PUs in the transmission range of SU 
i ∈  that can receive in band b ∈ i, as 
{ | , , }b Ti ij i ij d R j i b    .                (4) 
Similarly, the set of SUs that can interfere with the reception 
of PU j on band b is denoted as 
{ | , , , }b I bj kj j k j kk d R k j b            (5) 
where 
k j  is the set of licensed bands available to SU k 
and PU j, and b
k   indicates that k has a PU to which it 
can transmit interfering with reception at j. 
Based on the previous notations, we present the interference 
constraints. An SU i ∈  will be associated with a PU j ∈ 
on at most one band b at a time, and a PU j ∈  cannot 
receive from multiple SUs on the same band, 
{ | }
I1:  1  and  1b b
i i
b b
ij ijb j i j
x x
 
    .     (6) 
Interference between adjacent SUs must also be considered. 
According to (4), we note that when SU i ∈ is transmitting 
data on band b ∈ i, any other SU that can interfere with the 
reception of PU j cannot use this band. Thus, we have the 
following constraint, 
{ }
I2 :  + 1,   ,b
k
b b b
ij kq jq
x x k k i

   .             (7) 
Let us denote by 
b
ijt  the association between SU i ∈  and 
PU j ∈  on a particular channel b ∈ for data and spectrum 
trading purposes with  
1,  if  associates with   on band 
0,  otherwise
b
ij
i j b
t

 

                 (8) 
The trading association must satisfy the constraint, 
b b
ij ijt x . 
The trading topology =[ ]bijtT  provides information on the 
existing trading associations throughout the network. We 
assume that separate channels are used for the transmission of 
control messages between SUs and PUs for the association 
process. Thus, these messages do not interfere with data 
transmission. 
B. Problem Formulation 
Data and spectrum trading involves the PO, SO and their 
end users. Besides, each SU i has minimum requirements in 
terms of capacity cmin,i and availability of service duration τmin,i 
that a PU j must satisfy, 
min,
b
ij ij ia c c                                      (9) 
min,ij i                                     (10) 
The previous requirements result in the following demand 
for data volume from the SU: 
min, min, min,i i iQ c  .  
In this architecture, transmission from the SU to the base 
station (BS) is conducted in two hops by a decode and forward 
scheme: SU→PU and PU→BS. Let Qaj denote the available 
data of PU j. Then, the data volume transmitted between SU i 
and PU j is 
b
ij ij aja Q Q , where 
b
ija  is the channel availability 
in link lij and Qij is given by (2). Based on the requirements of 
SU i in the first hop (9)-(10) and transmission availability in 
the second hop, the PU will decide whether it accepts or not 
the association. After the PU relays the data from the SU, its 
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PUs SUs 
price (b,Q) 
data  
transmission  
(ρ) 
 
Q 
QoS b 
incentive  
(r(ρ)) 
PO SO 
PUs SUs 
price (b) 
price (Q) 
data 
transmission 
(ρ) 
 
QoS b 
revenue  
share 
(η(ρ)) 
PO SO 
PUs SUs 
revenue share (ψ(ρ)) 
price (b,Q) 
 
data 
transmission 
(ρ) 
 
QoS 
revenue 
share 
(η(ρ)) 
revenue  
share 
(σ(ρ)) 
data volume is reduced to b
oj ij ijQ a Q  and the data of SU i is 
extended to b
oi ij ijQ a Q . The relaying process is illustrated in 
Fig. 1c when SUs i1 and i2 get associated to PU j. If PU j does 
not transmit the agreed-on data its reliability will decrease and 
so will the trustworthiness of the connection. Second link 
transmissions will be scheduled by the primary operator (PO) 
and their analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
In the following subsections we present different policies for 
data and spectrum trading based on centralized, hybrid and 
distributed resource allocation. These policies rely on different 
revenue-sharing schemes between the PO and SO (ψ), the PO 
and PUs (η), and the SO and SUs (σ) as illustrated in Fig. 2. In 
these schemes (from left to right), the PO and SO delegate 
trading progressively to their end users and adopt more 
flexible trading polices to reduce complexity. The association 
between SUs and PUs depends on the trustworthiness of the 
connection ρ, which will also impact the level of revenue 
share. For clarity of presentation, first we design each trading 
framework for a given trustworthiness ρ and revenue share 
ψ(ρ)=ψ, η(ρ)=η and σ(ρ)=σ, and then we elaborate in detail the 
trust relationships and their influence on the revenue share in 
Section VI. By backward induction, we analyze the strategies 
of the different parties involved in the trading for each scheme. 
B1. Centralized Scheme 
Based on the SUs’ demand for data volume and QoS 
requirements, the SO identifies the necessary channels and 
available PUs to satisfy the demand. It then negotiates the 
price for these resources with the PO. Once both parties agree, 
the SO assigns to each SU the channel and PU that satisfies its 
QoS requirements. Finally, the PO rewards the PU for sharing 
its connectivity. In this scheme, as illustrated in Fig. 2a, the 
service is guaranteed by the operators through pricing.  
Suppose that the price per unit of data transmitted on 
channel b ∈ in link lij is bijp . The utility of the SO is defined 
as the difference between the social welfare in the secondary 
network and the price paid to the PO for the resources, 
1 1 1
 
N M B b b b b
S ij ij ij ij iji j b
U U t p a Q
  
                    (11) 
where 
b
ijU  is the utility of the SU i transmitting to PU j on 
channel b. It provides the value SU i gives to the initial data 
volume Qoi and demanded data volume Qij, 
log( )b b bij ij ij oi ij ijU t Q a Q                          (12) 
and 0 < ρij ≤ 1 is the trustworthiness of the connection. Its 
calculation is elaborated on Section VI. Pricing is used to 
allocate the resources fairly to SUs with respect to their initial 
purchased data. Users who have purchased a higher amount of 
initial data value the resources more and, thus, they will have 
more chances to get additional resources.  
 Given the price b
ijp  announced by the PO, the centralized 
optimization problem at the SO is as in (13), where b
ijt  
provides the channel allocation and SU-PU association and Qaj 
is the available data at PU j. This optimization yields the 
optimum trading topology 
* *[( ) ]bijtT  and data traded 
*
ijQ . 
,
1 1 1
min,
maximize     = ( log( ) )
subject to    ,  {0,1}, , ,
                   (6), (7), (9),  (10)
                   
b
ij ij
N M B
b b b b
S ij ij oi ij ij ij ij ij
t Q
i j b
b b b b
ij ij ij i i j
b
i ij ij
U t Q a Q p a Q
t x x i j b
Q a Q

  
 
     


                                        (13)ajQ
   
The SO will negotiate with the PO the price for the data and 
channels needed to satisfy the SUs’ optimal demand. This 
optimization problem is a mixed-integer linear programming 
problem with complexity (NMB). It can be optimally solved 
with standard algorithms (e.g., sequential fixing algorithm 
[29], branch and bound [30]) or software (e.g., CPLEX [31] 
and MATLAB) for small scenarios. 
Let rij denote the incentive in monetary units to compensate 
PU j for forwarding the data of SU i. The incentive is defined 
as 
* *( ) /b bij ij oj ij ij ajr t a Q Q  , where η is a revenue share 
between PO and PU, Фoj is the price of the data plan of PU j 
and Qaj is the available data at PU j. Physically, this means that 
the overall data forwarded will be compensated with an 
amount proportional to the price of the remaining available 
data. The utility of the PU is 
* *( ) log( )b b bji ij ji oj ij ij ij jV t Q a Q r e                (14) 
where ρji is the trust of PU j in the connection requested by SU 
i, and ej is the energy cost for serving as an access point. The 
details on the trust relationships are provided in Section VI. 
Next, the utility of the PO is defined as the difference 
between the payment from the SO and the incentive offered to 
each PU, 
* *
1 1 1
( )
N M B b b b
P ij ij ij ij iji j b
U t p a Q r
  
                (15) 
The PO and SO negotiate the price b
ijp  iteratively and in 
parallel for each SU i ∈  and PU j ∈ in channel b ∈  as 
outlined in Algorithm 1. In each iteration of the negotiation 
process a new association 
*( )bijt  and 
*
ijQ  are obtained solving 
(13) for the new negotiated price. After successive 
negotiations an agreement is reached2 and the agreed price is 
*( )bijp . The convergence speed of the algorithm can be 
controlled by tuning the values of the convergence error χ and 
b
ijp . A fine grained adjustment of 
b
ijp  will result into 
smaller χ but slower convergence. The detailed proof of 
convergence is shown in the Appendix. A similar collaborative 
 
2Let us recall that the cooperation between the PO and SO relies on 
resource pricing and revenue sharing to distribute the benefits of cooperation 
among the parties involved. The condition to reach an agreement is |US – α·UP| 
≤ χ, where α indicates the sharing of benefits between PO and SO, and χ is the 
convergence error. For simplicity, we have assumed the benefits are shared 
equally (i.e., α = 1). This requirement is used as a stop criterion in the 
algorithms presented in the paper. Nevertheless, our scheme admits any other 
sharing of benefits through parameter α. 
negotiation process is used in [36] to quantify the incentives 
for cooperation between cellular and small service operators. 
The negotiation mechanism leads to fair sharing of the benefits 
in each joint access network decision. For a comprehensive 
survey on pricing theory for spectrum trading, see [37]. 
Assuming that I1 iterations are needed to reach the 
agreement, the complexity of this algorithm is (I1(NMB+NM 
+ NMB)), where the first term inside the inner parentheses is 
the complexity of solving problem (13), the second term is the 
complexity of calculating the PU reward for serving each SU, 
and the third term is the complexity of calculating the PO 
utility. 
The centralized scheme is provided as a benchmark. In the 
next section, the SO and PO will progressively delegate the 
trading to the SUs and PUs to reduce the complexity of the 
problem but still receive some revenue. 
 
Algorithm 1 Centralized Data and Spectrum Trading  
1: PO announces an initial price pbij and a revenue share η with PUs  
2: SO solves (13) for current demand and price pbij to obtain (T
b)* and Q*ij 
3: PO calculates the revenue rij for PU j for forwarding data Q
*
ij   
4: PO calculates its utility in (15)  
5: SO and PO negotiate the price pbij as follows: 
6:  If US > UP + χ 
7:      PO announces a new price pbij ← p
b
ij + Δp
b
ij 
8:      Go back to 2) 
9:  elseif US < UP  – χ 
10:    PO announces a new price pbij ← p
b
ij – Δp
b
ij 
11:    Go back to 2) 
12: elseif |US – UP | ≤ χ 
13:    The optimum association (Tb)*, data Q*ij and trading price for the data  
         and channels (pbij)
* are obtained  
14: end 
B2. Hybrid Scheme 
In the hybrid scheme, the SO and PO negotiate the price for 
the channels while the SUs and PUs negotiate the price for the 
data. The PO allows PUs to trade with their data and benefit 
from the transaction. Each SU selects the most convenient PU, 
i.e., the PU with sufficient data availability and service 
duration to meet its QoS requirements. After the price and 
amount of data traded are agreed on, the SO determines which 
channels are needed for each SU-PU link to meet these 
requirements. The SO then negotiates the corresponding price 
for these channels with the PO and allocates them to each SU-
PU link for data transmission. Finally, the PU pays the PO a 
percentage of the revenue earned in trading the data. This 
scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2b. 
By abusing the notation, let us denote by tij = 1 when there is 
a trade between i and j (Qij > 0), and tij = 0 otherwise. The 
utility of the SU is redefined to include the data trading price 
πij between SU i and PU j as, 
( log( ) )ij ij ij oi ij ij ijU t Q Q Q                  (16) 
where Qij is the data traded. Notice that the data traded does 
not consider the channel that will be later assigned by the SO. 
The PU will sell its data volume in return for profit. This profit 
can be defined as the gain from serving an SU and the price 
charged for selling the data. Thus, the utility of a PU when 
selling data volume Qji is  
( log( ) )ji ij ji oj ji ij ji jV t Q Q Q e                (17) 
where η is the revenue share between the PO and the PU. 
Considering the connectivity requirements of the SU and the 
price of the data πij, the SU optimization is as follows,  
 
,
min,
maximize    ( log( ) )
subject to    , (10)
ij ij
ij ij ij oi ij ij ij
t Q
i ij aji
U t Q Q Q
Q Q Q
   
 
          (18) 
where 
min, min, min,i i iQ c   and ajiQ  is the available data PU j is 
willing to share with SU i.  In response to demand 
*
ijQ , we can 
then formulate the PU optimization problem as 
 
*
*
min,
maximize     ( log( ) )
subject to     ,   
ji
ji ij ji oj ji ji ji j
Q
ji aj i ji iji
V t Q Q Q e
Q Q Q Q Q
    
  
 (19) 
where the first constraint indicates that the total data volume 
sold by PU j cannot exceed its available data volume, and the 
second constraint guarantees that the data sought satisfies the 
demand. 
Optimization problems (18) and (19) are solved iteratively 
until the optimum values 
*
ijt  and 
*
ijQ  are obtained as detailed 
in Algorithm 2, together with the negotiation of the data price 
*
ij . The utility in (18) decreases linearly with ij  and in (19) 
increases linearly with respect to the same variable. Thus, they 
intersect at a single point 
*
ij . Then, the SO assigns the 
channels to maximize its utility which is defined as  
1 1 1
 
N M B b b b b
S ij ij ij iji j b
U U t a
  
                      (20) 
where 
b
ij  is the price per available channel charged by the PO. 
The SO optimization problem is as follows 
* * *
1 1 1
*
* *
maximize    ( log( ) ( ))
subject to    , ,  
                   ,  (6), (7)
                                    
b
ij
N M B
b b b b
S ij ij oi ij ij ij ij ij ij
t
i j b
b
ij ij i j
b b
ij ij
b
ij ij ij
U t Q a Q a Q
t t b b
t x
Q a Q
  
  
   
   



                                          (21)
 The frequency bands will be reused by SUs to reduce costs 
and assigned to the most profitable links to satisfy the 
negotiated data needs. This optimization problem is an integer 
linear programming problem and can be optimally solved in 
polynomial time using standard algorithms (e.g., sequential 
fixing algorithm [29], branch and bound [30]) or software 
(e.g., CPLEX [31] and MATLAB).  
Finally, the PO calculates its utility as 
* * * *
1 1 1
( ) (1 ) ( )
N M B b b b b b
P ij ij ij ij ij ij iji j b
U t a Q t a  
  
      (22) 
where η is the revenue share between the PO and the PU. 
The PO and SO iteratively negotiate the price per available 
channel and the optimum value 
*( )bij is obtained when |US – 
UP| ≤ χ. The selection of the step price 
b
ij  needed for the 
convergence of the price negotiation follows the same 
reasoning as the proof of convergence for Algorithm 1 in the 
Appendix. Due to space limitations the details are omitted. 
In this scheme, the price charged to the SO and SUs per 
channel and unit of data traded is /b bij ij ij ijp Q   , and the 
incentive that PU j receives for sharing its resources is 
* * *
ij ij ij ijr t Q . Since the channel is allocated to SU-PU links 
after the data negotiation, the uncertainty surrounding the final 
amount of data transmitted is higher than in the centralized 
approach. To compensate for this uncertainty, the price should 
be reduced accordingly as /ij oj ajQ  . 
This scheme is outlined in Algorithm 2. Let us denote by I2 
the number of iterations needed to solve the SU and PU 
optimization problems, and by '
2I  the number of iterations for 
the PO and the SO to reach an agreement. Then, the 
complexity of this algorithm is (I2(NM + NM) + '2I (NM
B + 
NMB)), where the first term is the complexity of solving (18) 
and (19), respectively, and the second term is the complexity 
of solving (21) and (22), respectively. The complexity of 
Algorithm 2 is significantly reduced compared to Algorithm 1. 
 
  
Algorithm 2 Hybrid Data and Spectrum Trading  
1: PU sets an initial data price πij and Qaji = Qaj 
2: SU solves (18) for the current price πij to obtain T
* and Q*ij 
3: PU solves (19) for the previous demand and obtains Q*ji  
4: Update Qaji = Q
*
ji    
5: Go to 2) until Q*ij = Q
*
ji    
6: PU provides a new price πij as follows: 
4: If Uij > Vji + χ’ 
5:     PU announces a new price πij ← πij  + Δπij 
6:     Go back to 2) 
7:  elseif Uij < Vji  – χ’ 
8:     PU announces a new price πij ← πij  – Δπij 
9:     Go back to 2) 
10: elseif  |Uij – Vji | ≤ χ’ 
11:   The optimum price π*ij and data Q
*
ij are obtained 
12: end 
13: PO announces the channel price εbij  
14: SO solves (21) for channel price εbij to obtain the optimum channel 
allocation (Tb)* 
15: SO and PO negotiate the price εbij as follows: 
16: If US > UP + χ 
17:      PO announces a new price εbij ← ε
b
ij + Δε
b
ij 
18:      Go back to 10) 
19:   elseif US < UP – χ 
20:      PO announces a new price εbij ← ε
b
ij – Δε
b
ij 
21:      Go back to 10) 
22:   elseif |US – UP | ≤ χ 
23:      The optimum association (Tb)*, data Q*ij and trading price for the data  
           and channels (εbij)
* are obtained  
24: end 
 
 
B3. Distributed Scheme  
 In the distributed scheme, the PO and SO delegate data and 
spectrum trading to their respective users. In other words, SUs 
negotiate the price for trading data and channels with PUs. The 
PO and SO agree on an initial revenue share for their 
cooperation and assist their users in the association process by 
providing information on the available channels. They both 
expect to obtain additional benefits from the trade. This 
scheme is shown in Fig. 2c. 
 Let us assume that 
i jb  . The utility of the SU and 
PU are redefined, respectively as, 
( log( ) (1 ) )b b b b bij ij ij oi ij ij ij ij ijU t Q a Q p a Q             (23) 
( log( ) )b b b b bji ij ji oj ij ji ij ij ji jV t Q a Q p a Q e             (24) 
where 
b
ijp  is the price per channel and unit of data transmitted 
and σ is the revenue share between the SO and SU (the SO 
compensates the SU by paying a percentage of the data cost 
for transmitting in the primary network). The optimization 
problem for each SU is formulated as: 
,
min,
maximize    ( log( ) (1 ) )
subject to    , (10)
b
ij ij
b b b b b
ij ij ij oi ij ij ij ij ij
t Q
i ij aji
U t Q a Q p a Q
Q Q Q
    
 
(25) 
 And the optimization problem for each PU is formulated as: 
*
,
*
min,
maximize     ( ) ( log( ) )
subject to     ,                     (26)
b
ij ji
b b b b b
ji ij ji oj ij ji ij ij ji j
p Q
ji aj i ji iji
V t Q a Q p a Q e
Q Q Q Q Q
    
  
 
 To solve the previous optimization problems distributively 
and with low computational complexity, we develop a 
distributed data and spectrum trading algorithm (Algorithm 
3), described in the next section, based on matching theory. 
This algorithm provides the optimum 
*( )bijt , 
*
ijQ   and 
*( )bijp .  
Let us assume that the PO and SO agree on a revenue share 
ψ. Then, the utility of the SO is  
* * *
1 1 1
(1 )[ ( ) ( ) ]
N M B b b b b
S ij ij ij ij iji j b
U U t p a Q 
  
      
where σ is the percentage of the price granted to the SU. 
Accordingly, the utility of the PO is given by the revenue 
share with the SO ψ and the percentage 1 – η of the gain 
obtained by the PU for trading its data, 
* * * * * *
1 1 1
[ ( ) ( ) ]+( ) (1 )( )
N M B b b b b b b b
P ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij iji j b
U U t p a Q t p a Q  
  
    
 The optimum revenue share ψ* is obtained iteratively when 
|US – UP| ≤ χ. The revenue-sharing policies for the three 
schemes are shown in Table II, and their complexity is 
summarized in Table III.  
 
Table II. Revenue sharing policies 
 Centralized Hybrid Distributed / Matching 
PO → PU /boj ij ij aja Q Q
 
ij ijQ
 
b b
ij ij ijp a Q  
SO → PO b b
ij ij ijp a Q
 b b
ij ija   ( )
b b b
ij ij ij ijU p a Q   
SU → PU – πijQij b bij ij ijp a Q  
SO → SU – – b bij ij ijp a Q  
 
Table III. Computational complexity 
Centralized 
(Algorithm 1) 
Hybrid 
(Algorithm 2) 
Distributed / Matching 
(Algorithm 3) 
(I1(NMB+NM + 
NMB)) 
(I2(NM+NM)+      
'
2I (NM
B+NMB)) 
(NMBI3(log(MB) + 
log(NB)) 
V. JOINT DATA AND SPECTRUM TRADING MATCHING 
ALGORITHM 
Our next goal is solving the distributed data and spectrum 
trading problem (25)-(26) with low computational complexity 
to capture network dynamics. In a dense CDNA it is desirable 
to solve resource allocation in a decentralized and self-
organized way to facilitate SU-PU associations and data and 
spectrum trading decisions without having to rely on a 
centralized controller. One suitable tool for developing 
decentralized and self-organized solutions, which can solve the 
optimization problem and avoid combinatorial complexity, is 
the framework of matching games [32]. In this regard, we 
consider matching theory to solve the distributed SU and PU 
optimization problems in (25)-(26), which involve SU-PU 
associations, channel allocation and price for data and 
channels as explained in Section IV.B3. In a matching game 
two sets of players must be assigned to each other according to 
their preferences. Each player ranks the players in the other set 
using a preference relation. Therefore, we formulate the 
problem as a two-sided many-to-one matching game in which 
each SU i can be associated with only one PU j that 
satisfies its QoS requirements. In addition, each PU can admit 
a certain quota of users served on different channels                 
( b
ij jii b
a Q   ajQ ). SUs and PUs rank one another based 
on their respective utilities defined in (23) and (24). In the 
sequel, we develop the matching algorithm to solve the data 
and spectrum trading distributively for a snap shot of the 
network, and in Section VII we present the dynamic tracking. 
A. Data and Spectrum Trading Game 
We formally define the data and spectrum trading game by 
the tuple ( , , , , ) . Here, { }i i  and 
{ }j j  denote, respectively, the set of preference 
relations of SUs and PUs. For any two PUs j, j’ ∈  and two 
channels b, b’ ∈ , the preference relation 
i
 for SU i 
according to (23) is defined as: '( , ) ( , ') b bi ij ijj b j b U U    
and ( , ) ( ', )ij b j b    '
b b
ij ijU U . Similarly, the preference 
relation 
j
 for PU j over two SUs i, i’ ∈ , and two channels 
b, b’ ∈ according to (24) is defined as: 
'( , ) ( , ') b bj ji jii b i b V V   and ( , ) ( ', )ji b i b '
b b
ji jiV V  . 
Definition 1. A many-to-one matching problem in CDNA is 
a function μ from the set   into the set 
   such that 
1)  j = μ(i,b) if and only if i = μ(j,b),  
2) | μ(i,b) | = 1 and | μ(j,b) | = 1, 
3) | ( , ) | 1
b
i b   and | ( , ) | min( , )ajb j b B n   where B 
is the number of channels and naj is the number of SUs that 
can be served by PU j with Qaj. 
4) 
( , )
| ( , ) | | ( , ) | 1b
i bk
i b k b

 

   where ( , )
b
i b
 is the set of 
SUs that can interfere with the reception of μ(i,b) on band b. 
Definition 2. A pair (i, j) ∉ μ where i ∈ , j ∈ is a 
blocking pair for the matching μ,if (i) ( , ) ( ( , ), )ij b i b b  or 
( , ) ( ( , '), ')ij b i b b , and (ii) ( , ) ( ( , ), )ji b j b b  or 
( , ) ( ( , '), ')ji b j b b . Accordingly, a matching is blocked by 
(i, j) when SU i and PU j prefer each other to their current 
matching on the same or different channel. A matching μ is 
stable if and only if there is no blocking pair.  
A matching solution for the data and spectrum trading game 
is stable if after the SU and PU agree on the amount of data 
and price for transmission on a particular channel, there are no 
SU-PU associations or channel allocations that will improve 
the current matching. In other words, the utility of the SU and 
PU in (23) and (24) will not be increased by if another PU or 
SU or another channel is selected. 
B. Distributed Data and Spectrum Trading Algorithm 
To solve the formulated data and spectrum trading game, 
we propose a novel distributed algorithm (Algorithm 3) that 
allows the players to self-organize into a stable matching that 
guarantees their connectivity requirements. The proposed 
algorithm consists of two main stages: Stage 1 focuses on 
matching and price initialization and Stage 2 determines the 
matching and trading price.  
First, we assume an initial price for the data (0)bijp . This 
will be updated later on based on data demand and supply. In 
Stage I, each SU i selects for every available channel b a set of 
PUs that satisfy its QoS requirements, denoted by set b
i
, 
and sorts them in decreasing order according to the utility 
function in (23). Similarly, each PU j selects a set of SUs 
denoted by b
j
 in decreasing order according to the utility in 
(24).  
The data demand and supply functions for each potential 
SU-PU association are obtained by differentiating the utilities 
in (23) and (24) with respect to Qij and Qji and making them 
equal to zero [33], respectively,  
1
(1 )
ijb
ij ij oib b
ij ij
Q Q
a p


 
     
                    (27) 
1 jib
ji ji ojb b
ij ij
Q Q
a p


 
    
 
                          (28) 
The demand and supply functions depend on the channel 
availability 
b
ija  at link lij, the trustworthiness of the connection 
ρij, the data price 
b
ijp , the price compensation by the SO σ and 
by the PO η, respectively, and the initial amount of data 
purchased Qoi and Qoj, respectively. The calculation of the 
trustworthiness is elaborated in Section VI. SUs and PUs 
exchange their demand and supply per channel b with their 
selected counterparts to accurately estimate the price. The total 
data demand and supply on channel b at equilibrium is 
b b b b
j i j i
b b
ij jii j i j   
     and, the equilibrium 
price is derived iteratively using the following equation,  
 ( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )b b
j i
b b b b
ij ij j ij jii j
p p    
 
      (29) 
where the price in the next iteration is the difference between 
demand and supply at time δ, weighted by the learning rate ϖ 
and added to the price in the current iteration. This pricing 
function adjusts the demand and supply until the price 
converges to the optimal price. The stability of the price 
depends on the learning rate ϖ j which is analyzed in Section 
V.C. 
Next, each SU and PU updates the utility according to (23) 
and (24), respectively, with the new price b
ijp  and re-orders its 
lists of preferences. After the initialization, the matching is 
formed in Stage II. Each SU i sends a proposal to its preferred 
PUs as in b
i
. The PUs accept or reject the proposals 
according to their preferences as per  b
j
. This process is 
repeated until all SUs are matched to a PU or rejected by all 
their preferred PUs. The new price is obtained by (29) for the 
current matching with ( )bi   and ( )
b
j  . The PUs then 
broadcast the new price b
ijp , which includes information on 
the allocated channels and selected SUs so that adjacent PUs 
will not allocate the same channels if there is interference. SU 
and PU preferences may change with the new matching and, if 
this happens, they will need to update their list of preferences. 
The algorithm terminates once ( )bi   and ( )
b
j   remain 
the same for two consecutive matchings. As a result, the 
trading topology *( ) {1| ( ), ( )}b b bij j it i j     is obtained 
together with the optimal price *( )bijp  as in (29), for the 
optimum data transmitted per unit of spectrum (Qij)* obtained 
by (27)-(28) at the equilibrium.  
 
 
Algorithm 3 Distributed Data and Spectrum Trading  
1: Procedure – Price calculation 
2:   for each SU i :  
3:    for each j ∈ b
i
: 
4:       Obtain local data demand (27), supply (28), and learning rate (30) 
5:       Obtain price pbij(δ + 1) using (29) 
6:       while | pbij(δ + 1)  − p
b
ij(δ) | > ε do 
7:           Update data demand (27) and supply (28) 
8:           Calculate learning rate ϖj  (30) and update price p
b
ij(δ + 1) using (29) 
9:          δ = δ + 1  
10:     end  
11:   end 
12:  end 
13: Stage 1 – Initialization 
14: Initialize the price to pbij(0) 
15: Each SU i chooses a set of PUs on channel b b
i
 following 
i
 as in (23) 
16: Each PU j selects a set of SUs b
j
 following 
j
as in (24) 
17: Obtain the price pbij(δ) for the initial demand and supply 
18: Obtain b
ijU  and 
b
jiV  with the new price and reorder 
b
i
and b
j
 
19: Stage 2 – Matching and price determination 
20: Each SU i issues proposals to its preferred PU, and the PU accepts or 
rejects the proposal  
21: Calculate price (29) for current matching μ with ( )bj   and ( )bj   
22: Obtain b
ijU  and 
b
jiV  with the new price and reorder 
b
i
 and b
j
 
23: Go back to 20 until ( )bj   and ( )bj   remain unchanged for two 
consecutive iterations 
24: As result, (tbij)
*, (pbij)
* and (Qij)
* are obtained 
 
C. Stability of the Proposed Algorithm 
Let us first analyze the externalities of the data and spectrum 
market. 
Remark 1. The proposed data and spectrum trading game 
has positive and negative externalities. 
 
Indeed, the preferences of SUs and PUs change as the game 
evolves. In CDNA, the more PUs participating in the market, 
the more likely an SU will find a good match and vice versa. 
We study the externalities by focusing on the local network 
effects of SUs and PUs (local CDNA). 
For an SU i ∈ ( )bj  : 
 A new available PU j’ is a positive externality if it 
increases b
ijU , ( )
b
ij   due to any of the following reasons: 
a) ',  ' ( )bji i   / '( ', ) ( , )ij b j b , hence the quality of the 
connection between SU i and PU j improves, or, b)  
( ', ) ( , )ij b j b  and, thus, '
b b
i ij  , so the price 
b
ijp  
decreases since the supply increases for the existing demand.  
 By contrast, the arrival of a new SU i’ is a negative 
externality if b
ijU  decreases due to any of the following 
reasons: a) ',  ' ( )bij j   / '( ', ) ( , )ji b i b , so this new 
association may reduce the quality of the connection between 
SU i and PU j, or, b) ( ', ) ( , )ji b i b  and, thus, '
b b
j ji  , 
so the price bijp  increases since the demand increases for the 
existing supply. 
The effects are the opposite for a PU j. The pricing 
mechanism in (29) captures the previous behavior. After a 
price is obtained for each potential match, the SUs and PUs 
need to update their list of preferences since they may have 
changed as result of the previous externalities. 
Solutions for finding a stable matching such as the deferred 
acceptance algorithm [32] may not converge to a stable 
matching when the game has externalities. Instead, we prove 
that our new matching algorithm converges to a stable 
matching to solve the data and spectrum trading game. 
Let us first restate the general definition of stable matching 
in our game: 
Definition 3. A local CDNA served by PU j is stable if both 
of the following conditions are satisfied:  
1) If SU i ∉ ( )bj  , then it cannot join the local CDNA. 
That is, there is no pair (i, j) ∉ μ in which ( , ) ( ( , ), )ji b j b b  
and ( , ) ( ( , ), )ij b i b b  or ( , ) ( ( , '), ')ji b j b b  and 
( , ) ( ( , '), ')ij b i b b . 
2) If SU i ∈ ( )bj  , then it cannot leave the local CDNA. 
That is, there is no pair (i, j’) ∉ μ, j ≠ j’ in which 
( ', ) ( ( , ), )ij b i b b  and '( , ) ( ( ', ), )ji b j b b  or 
( ', ) ( ( , '), ')ij b i b b  and '( , ) ( ( ', '), ')ji b j b b . 
Next, we show that the algorithm converges to a stable 
matching as previously defined even with externalities. 
 
Theorem 1. The stability of each local CDNA is achieved 
after a finite number of iterations and, thus, Algorithm 3 is 
guaranteed to reach a stable matching and price for data and 
spectrum trading. 
 
Proof. The proof follows from two considerations. First, 
SUs can reach a limited number of PUs in their vicinity due to 
restricted transmission ranges, and thus the number of 
alternatives for both SUs and PUs is finite. Indeed, each PU 
has a finite number of SUs to form a local CDNA and each SU 
has a limited number of CDNAs to switch to. Second, the price 
updated as in (29) converges to a stable price [33]. The 
stability of the price depends mainly on the learning rate. The 
most common way of analyzing stability is to consider the 
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the pricing function in 
(29). Following [33], the fixed point b
ijp  is stable if and only if,  
20 1 ( ) (1 ) / ( ( 1 ))b bj ij ij ija p                (30) 
Recall that this is the criterion used in the selection of ϖj in 
Algorithm 3. 
D. Computational Complexity and Signaling Overhead 
In the first step, each SU and PU builds its set of preferred 
counterparts per channel of size b
i
= MB and b
j
= NB, 
respectively, by calculating the utilities (23) and (24) for each 
potential matching. The complexity of calculating the utilities 
and ordering the preferences for N SUs and M PUs is 
(NMB(log(MB) + log(NB))). In the worst case each SU will 
issue MB proposals to find a suitable PU. Thus, the total 
attempts by N SUs will be at most NMB. Finally, the price is 
computed in (29), which has complexity (NMB), and each 
PU and SU will reorder its preferences. The algorithm will 
terminate after a finite number of iterations I3. The worst case 
complexity of Algorithm 3 is thus (NMBI3(log(MB) + 
log(NB)), which is significantly lower than that of Algorithms 
1 and 2.  
SUs and PUs exchange their respective demand and supply 
per channel with their selected counterparts to calculate the 
price, build their preference lists and avoid channel allocations 
that might interfere with existing matchings. As mentioned 
previously, in the worst case the signaling complexity is 
(NMBI3). The operators supervise the trading and ensure that 
the transactions are reflected in SUs’ and PUs’ monthly bills. 
VI. TRUST RELATIONSHIPS IN CDNA 
In a real network, SUs and PUs may act selfishly and 
misbehave with the aim of obtaining greater profit. In this 
section, we consider trust relationships between SUs and PUs 
to build a secure trust network for collaborative data and 
spectrum trading. In this regard, we develop a trust mechanism 
together with a behavioral-based access control scheme to 
incentivize and penalize honest and dishonest behavior, 
respectively.  
Let us assume that if PU j is selfish it may decide not to 
transmit the agreed-on data to save battery power degrading 
the initial utility of SU i, b
ijU , to 
b
ijU . We define the reliability 
of PU j as the consistency of its trading agreement given by ξj 
= b
ijU /
b
ijU . A selfish SU i may also decide to leave the 
network before paying for the data transmitted degrading the 
utility of PU j, b
jiV , to 
b
jiV . Similarly, the reliability of SU i is 
ξi =
b
jiV /
b
jiV . This calculation considers the most recent 
experience with the other party. The calculation of the 
reliability based also on past experiences can be obtained using 
the exponential moving average as in [38]. The trust of user i 
in the connection provided by user j is denoted by ρij and is 
included in the utility function of SU i, b
ijU , in (12), (16) and 
(23). The trustworthiness of the connection is computed as 
follows, 
(1 )dir indij ij ijO O                             (31) 
where 
dir
ijO  is user i’s direct experience with j, 
ind
ijO  is the 
recommendation of other users based on their experiences with 
j and ω is the weight. All these parameters lie in the range 
[0,1]. Likewise, the trust of user j in the connection requested 
by i is denoted by ρji as in the utility of PU j, 
b
jiV , in (14), (17) 
and (24), and is obtained as before. 
We model the direct observation by user i of the behavior of 
user j using a sigmoidal utility function (Fig. 3) from 
behavioral economics [34] used to describe users’ investment 
decisions, and extend it to model users’ trading decisions in 
CDNA (i.e., how PUs and SUs make decisions about selling 
and buying resources based on the potential value of losses and 
gains). Recall that in CDNA connectivity is provided by users 
who share the residual connectivity of their devices. We 
assume that each user advertises its reliability level to potential 
counterparts. Then, direct observation by user i of behavior by 
user j is, 
( )
( ) 1/ (1 )j i
hdir
ij jO e
 

 
                      (32) 
where h and ϕ are scaling coefficients, ξj is the reliability of 
user j and ϕξi is the reference point. User i perceives the values 
( )dirij jO  > ϕξi as gains and ( )
dir
ij jO  < ϕξi as loses. Note that 
the values of the function on both sides of the reference point 
are asymmetrical to capture loss aversion – people’s tendency 
to prefer avoiding losses rather than acquiring equivalent 
gains.  
 Malicious users may lie and give their counterparts a bad 
recommendation (bad-mouthing) in order to have exclusive 
access to resources. Consequently, users will give more weight 
to their own observations than to others’. Besides, to increase 
the robustness of the trust evaluation we define the credibility 
of the recommender C based on the number of transactions n 
between both nodes. Thus, the credibility of the 
recommendation given by user i’, i’≠ i, to user j is 
' ' ' ' ''
/ ( )i j i j i j i jj jC n n n  .                  (33)  
This expression is used to weight the indirect opinions 
provided by other users proportionally to the number              
of   transactions   conducted.   Since  SUs  may  have  different 
    
 Fig.3. dir
ijO
 vs ξj with h = 20, ϕ = 4/5.   Fig.4. Price negotiation between PO & SO. Fig.5. Price negotiation between SUs i1, i2 & PU j. Fig.6. Distributed pricing.       
 
connectivity requirements which may result in different 
expectations, we define a similarity factor Sii’ between SU i 
and i’ to indicate the similarity between two users and the 
relevance of the recommendation.  
Thus, the recommendation is obtained as 
' ' ''
ind dir
ij ii i j i ji i
O S C O

                          (34) 
where 
'
dir
i jO  is observation by user i of behavior by user j as in 
(32). It is worth noting that the trustworthiness is asymmetric, 
i.e., ρij ≠ ρji. To improve the robustness of the network to 
malicious users and encourage consistent behavior, we define 
a behavioral-based access control mechanism to incentivize 
and penalize honest and dishonest behavior by users. The PO 
and SO, respectively, regulate PU and SU access to CDNA by 
dynamically adjusting the revenue sharing parameters η and σ 
according to their users’ trustworthiness. The higher the 
trustworthiness of the connection provided (requested) by PUs 
(SUs), the higher the revenue η (σ) offered by the PO (SO). 
Consequently, the PO compensates participation by PU j with 
a revenue share  
/ | |j ij iji                                 (35)  
Similarly, the SO compensates SU i with a revenue share 
 / | |i ji jij                                 (36) 
 Both operators may also set up a trustworthiness threshold 
and restrict access to users who satisfy that threshold. 
This two-level trust mechanism which encompasses 
partially distributed (via local physical interactions) and 
partially centralized (via the involvement of operators) trust 
management allows the construction of a robust and secure 
trust network for data and spectrum trading purposes 
completing the model described in Fig. 2. 
 
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
We present some numerical results to verify our theoretical 
analysis, evaluate the schemes and compare them with existing 
mechanisms. The experimental environment is Matlab.  
A. Settings 
We consider a CDNA consisting of M PUs and N SUs 
randomly distributed in a 1000 x 1000 m2 area. We assume 
that each user has a monthly contract for a data volume of 10 
GB. The transmission range and interference range are set to 
500 m [29]. The path loss exponent is α = 4 and β = 62.5. The 
noise power spectral density is γ = 3.34×10−20W/Hz at all 
nodes. The transmission power spectral density of the nodes is 
8.1×109γ, and the reception threshold and interference 
threshold are both 8.1γ on each spectrum band. The minimum 
SINR requirement varies between [5, 20] dB and the duration 
of the connectivity varies between [0, 10] minutes. The 
convergence error χ and χ’ are set to 10-4.  
Regarding the return of PUs, the availability b
ija  of a 
licensed band for SU transmission at a certain location has a 
random probability within (0.5, 1]. We run Monte Carlo 
simulations and average the results over 100 iterations. 
B. Data and Spectrum Trading Schemes 
We assume M = 5 PUs and N = 10 SUs, a revenue share of σ 
= η = 0.7 and B = 5 available channels. The price negotiation 
process between the PO and SO is shown in Fig. 4 for the 
centralized and hybrid schemes. The negotiation in the 
distributed scheme follows the same tendency and it is omitted 
for clarity of presentation. The price is initialized to 0.1. In the 
centralized scheme, the PO and SO negotiate the price b
ijp  per 
unit of data transmitted on channel b. For clarity of illustration, 
we have assumed the same price for all channels/links b
ijp p . 
The optimum trading price p* is obtained when the cooperation 
agreement is met, i.e., |ΔU| = |US – UP| ≤ χ, as shown in Fig. 4. 
A lower (higher) price may discourage PO (SO) participation 
in the trading. Similarly, in the hybrid scheme the PO and SO 
negotiate the price per channel b
ij  . In Fig. 5 we present 
the negotiation of the data price πij between SUs i1, i2 with 
heterogeneous requirements and PU j. The optimum price is 
obtained when |Uij – Vji| ≤ χ’ for i = i1, i2 with χ’ ≈  0. It is worth 
noting that since SUs i1 and i2 have different requirements the 
prices for their data transmission 
1
*( )i j  and 2
*( )i j  are different. 
The equilibrium price in the distributed scheme is shown in 
Fig. 6 for M = 3 and 5. Each pair of demand/supply curves 
represents a local CDNA. As expected, increasing the price 
decreases the demand and increases the supply until the 
equilibrium price is obtained. Besides, the higher M (number 
of supply sources) the lower the equilibrium price. In Fig. 7 we 
plot the overall utilities of the SUs, PUs, SO and PO for the 
three schemes. In the hybrid and distributed schemes, the PU 
and SU reach an agreement for the trading and, thus, both 
utilities are the same. In the centralized scheme the utility of 
the PU is higher than that of the SU as the PU is additionally 
rewarded for transmitting SU data. In the hybrid scheme the 
PU and SU only negotiate the price for the data.    
     
Fig. 7. USU, UPU, USO and UPO versus M.  Fig. 8. Overall Q transmitted versus M. Fig. 9. Traded price versus M.   Fig. 10. Trading efficiency of the hybrid scheme. 
     
Table IV. Dynamic reconfiguration 
scenario N M B 
Centralized Hybrid Distributed  MCM Random 
USU 
CPU time 
(s) 
USU  
CPU 
time (s) 
USU CPU 
time (s) 
USU  
CPU 
time (s) 
USU CPU 
time (s) 
1 10 3 5 9.6490 7.6702 11.6007 0.0867 7.8907 0.0961 6.9810 0.0532 6.3798 0.00364 
2 9 3 5 8.7932 6.0409 8.7597 0.1244 8.0221 0.0225 7.1601 0.0310 6.0919 0.00293 
3 9 3 4 7.6563 3.7976 7.6430 0.0672 6.7429 0.0819 5.4280 0.0497 4.0461 0.00210 
4 9 4 4 7.8919 6.6540 8.7443 0.1226 8.3570 0.0791 7.1674 0.0558 6.3152 0.00468 
5 10 4 4 8.3441 7.4472 8.8493 0.1126 10.145 0.0725 9.7857 0.0651 9.1327 0.00423 
6 10 4 5 8.9101 21.3824 11.6349 0.1021 8.5382 0.0386 8.3021 0.0584 9.7019 0.00483 
 
 
 
 
Since the negotiation does not consider channel availability, 
the utility is higher than in the centralized scheme. After 
channel allocation, the final data transmitted is lower but the 
price remains the same, which reduces the utility. In the 
distributed scheme, the PU and SU negotiate the price for data 
and channels. With the same revenue share, their utilities are 
slightly higher than that of the SU utility in the centralized 
scheme. The utilities of the SO and PO are shown for the three 
schemes as well after the negotiation agreement. In the 
centralized scheme, both operators agree on a fixed price for 
the resources, while in the hybrid and distributed scheme, the 
PO and SO benefit from the amount of data traded 
proportionally to 1 – η and 1 – σ, respectively. The highest 
utility is obtained with the hybrid scheme as this has the 
highest price per unit of data and spectrum. 
In Fig. 8 the overall amount of data transmitted is plotted for 
each scheme. The highest amount of data is transmitted in the 
centralized scheme as the SO reuses available channels to 
maximize   its   utility.  In   the   hybrid   scheme,   the   PU-SU 
association is performed locally for data trading without 
information on channel availability. Allocating the channels a 
posteriori is less efficient and therefore less data is transmitted. 
In the distributed scheme, SU-PU associations are performed 
in a self-organized manner with local knowledge of the 
available resources (channels and PUs). Thus, the overall data 
transmitted is higher than in the hybrid scheme. Even though 
not all potential associations are accomplished, the overall data 
transmitted is slightly lower than in the centralized scheme. 
These results are compared to random matching, which 
includes random SU-PU associations and random channel 
allocation. We can observe that the latter scheme is very 
inefficient. Besides, we also consider a minimum distance 
matching (MDM) scheme, which considers SU-PU 
associations based on shortest distance. Since it jointly 
produces the SU-PU associations and channel allocation it 
performs slightly better than the hybrid scheme but 30% and 
20% worse than the centralized and distributed schemes, 
respectively. 
In Fig. 9 the trading price per unit of data and channel is 
shown for the three schemes. The highest price for data and 
channels is obtained in the hybrid scheme. Here the price is 
negotiated for a higher volume of data than that finally 
transmitted, which reduces Qaj and consequently increases the 
price with respect to the centralized scheme, i.e., πij > Фoj / Qaj.  
The price for the distributed scheme is locally adjusted based 
on demand and supply. Since the supply of data per local 
CDNA is greater than the demand, the price is reduced to 
attract more SUs.  
The trading efficiency of the hybrid scheme is shown in Fig. 
10 for different numbers of channels. The efficiency is defined 
as the ratio between the final data traded considering channel 
availability and the initial data agreed-on for trading. Even 
with an efficiency of 1 the overall data traded in the hybrid 
scheme is the lowest of the three schemes. This is because the 
data trading association is marked by uncertain channel 
availability and the same association is later used for the 
channel allocation.  
C. Dynamic Data and Spectrum Trading 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our 
algorithms under traffic dynamics. The results are shown in 
Table IV for different scenarios, which represent different 
observation instants. We consider one traffic change per 
scenario (e.g., an SU or PU arrives or leaves or a new channel 
becomes available or unavailable). In the first scenario, N = 
10, M = 3 and B = 5. In the second one, an SU leaves the 
network. Similar changes take place in the other cases. The 
computational time of the hybrid scheme is one order of 
magnitude faster than that of the centralized scheme but the 
distributed scheme reconfigures the network two orders of 
magnitude faster than in the centralized scheme for most 
scenarios considered, and even three orders of magnitude 
faster when there are more resources available.  
The low computational time of the matching algorithm 
makes it a promising option for tracking traffic dynamics and  
reconfiguring the network in real time. The results are 
compared to MCM and random matching. MCM is about 15% 
inferior compared to the distributed scheme and its 
computational time is about 20% lower. Meantime, the random 
matching has the lowest computational time, although its 
performance may drop a 40% compared to that of centralized 
scheme. 
In order to make a fair comparison of the schemes we have 
considered that the length of the list of preferences for each SU 
i and PU j is b
i M  and 
b
j N , respectively. 
Nevertheless, the length of the list of preferences can be 
limited to facilitate faster reconfigurability, and the algorithm 
can be stopped at any time related to desirable complexity and 
performance tradeoffs. Algorithm 4 incorporates the dynamic 
tracking of traffic variations into the matching algorithm. 
 
Algorithm 4 Dynamic Data and Spectrum Trading  
1: Run Stage 1 – Initialization (δ = 0)  
2: Run Stage 2 – Matching and price determination (steps 20-22)      
        SUs associate with their preferred PU and vice versa, on matching μ  
3: while δ < δmax 
4:     Run Stage 2 – Matching and price determination (steps 20-22) and  
        obtain matching μ’         
5:     if the matching is stable (μ = μ’)  
6:         reconfigure the network with μ’ 
7:     end 
8:     μ ← μ’; δ = δ + 1 
9: end         
 
D. Trust relationships 
We evaluate the impact of trust relationships on the price 
and overall performance of CDNA. We use the distributed 
algorithm with N = 10 SUs, M = 10 PUs and B = 10 channels. 
We assume that if a user is reliable its reliability probability ξ 
will vary randomly between [0.9, 1] and if it is unreliable it 
will vary between [0.5, 0.9]. SUs and PUs will be willing to 
connect to their counterparts when the trustworthiness of the 
link is ρij, ρji > 0.5, respectively. The price of data and channels 
is shown in Fig. 11 for different probabilities Ri and Rj of 
having a reliable SU and PU, respectively. If Ri decreases, the 
incentive provided by the SO also decreases to penalize SU i. 
Consequently, this reduces demand and the price decreases to 
attract more SUs. The opposite behavior is observed for Rj 
since a decrease in Rj reduces the supply, which will increase 
the price.  
As already mentioned, the PO and SO control PU and SU 
access to CDNA by dynamically adjusting parameters η and σ 
to their behavior, as shown in Fig. 12. We assume that Ri = 
0.5. It is worth noticing that when Rj > Ri, the PO will 
encourage the PUs to join CDNA with η > σ since the 
trustworthiness is ρij > ρji. The opposite behavior can be 
observed when Rj < Ri. Thus, the access control mechanism 
captures the users’ behavior.   
In a large CDNA, computation of trustworthiness should be 
autonomous to reduce the latency and overhead of exchanging 
recommendations. The main properties of trust (asymmetry, 
transitivity and composability) can be explored to automate the 
trust evaluation process. Regarding the property of transitivity, 
if i trusts j and j trusts i' then i can trust i'. We can exploit this 
property and obtain i' recommendation on j given the 
similarity Sii’ between i and i'. Composability is the ability to 
compose recommendations from different users.  By using the 
previous properties, trustworthiness is expressed as  
' ' '
' ' '' / 0 '
/ | |
ij j i
ij ii i j i jj j i i
S
 
  
  
                 (35) 
where user i relies on the recommendations from every user i’ 
that has used the same PU j’.  
In Fig. 12 we also present the accuracy of the estimation of 
the access control parameters when the trust calculation is 
automated versus Rj. We can see the values of η and σ obtained 
when the system is initialized with 50 and 75 samples and runs 
autonomously for 100 samples, compared to when it is run 
non-autonomously for 100 samples. In the worst case there is 
an error in the estimation of about 2%. It was observed that 
such a deviation in the access control parameters resulted in 
insignificant differences in terms of the utilities of users and 
operators.  
 
 
Fig. 11. Data and channel price vs. M.   Fig. 12. Autonomous access control. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents collaborative trading schemes for data 
and spectrum sharing that create business opportunities for 
users and operators, while enforcing trustworthy relations. The 
business opportunities result from harvested data and spectrum 
trading between users and operators. Unlike existing 
approaches which mainly focus on spectrum access, by 
defining joint data and spectrum trading policies, we involve 
users in service delivery.  The three schemes proposed, 
centralized, hybrid and distributed, progressively delegate 
trading to end users to favor distributed implementations. The 
control knobs that determine these implementations are the 
revenue sharing policies η and σ in the primary and secondary 
network. 
Numerical results show that the hybrid scheme is 1 order of 
magnitude faster than the centralized scheme and that the 
matching algorithm reconfigures the network two orders of 
magnitude faster than the centralized scheme in most scenarios 
considered and even three orders of magnitude faster when 
there are more resources available. This makes the matching 
algorithm a promising option for exploiting available resources 
in real time. In addition, the performance of the hybrid scheme 
is very close to that of the centralized scheme. By modeling 
user behavior in the access control mechanism we preserve a 
trustworthy and autonomous trading system.  
Data and spectrum trading in CDNA involves many 
transactions between the PO and SO and their respective users. 
Existing blockchain payment systems can facilitate secure 
transactions although reducing consensus latency in very dense 
networks is an open challenge. Besides, blockchain payments 
can provide reliable information on recorded transactions 
contributing to trustworthiness in CDNA. This work could be 
used as a case study to develop simplified payment systems 
based on blockchain technology. Besides, it opens future 
research opportunities such as developing mathematical 
frameworks for reasoning about trust, modeling of user 
misbehavior, and its extension to real traffic models. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of convergence for Algorithm 1:  
In the following we prove that after successive negotiations 
the PO and SO reach an agreement i.e., |ΔU | = |US – UP | ≤ χ 
and, thus, Algorithm 1 converges to the optimum price *( )bijp  
for each SU i ∈  and PU j ∈ in channel b ∈ . For 
simplicity we assume that users transmit the same amount of 
data Qij = Q and all links have the same price 
b
ijp p , and 
b
iji j b
n t   . Let us rewrite the price update in a 
compact form as: p(t+1) = p(t) + Δp·sgn(ΔU(t)) with 
sgn(ΔU(t))  =  – 1 if ΔU(t) < 0, sgn(ΔU(t)) = 0 if ΔU(t) = 0, 
and sgn(ΔU(t)) = 1 if ΔU(t) > 0. If ΔU(t) > 0, the new price 
p(t+1) increases moving in the direction towards the agreement 
point. On the other hand, if ΔU(t) < 0, the new price p(t+1) 
decreases until the agreement point is reached. Thus, the 
function ΔU is monotone decreasing i.e. ∂ΔU(p)/∂p < 0 p  
and the system converges eventually  to a single global 
equilibrium point. The step size required to bring the positions 
closer i.e. |ΔU (t + 1)| < |ΔU (t) | in each case is: a) if ΔU (t) > 
0 after the price update US(t + 1) < US (t). The new PO utility 
must satisfy UP(t + 1) ≥ UP (t) and thus the required price step 
is  ( / )o ap p Q    ( / ' ' 1)nQ n Q  ; b) if ΔU (t) < 0 
after the price update explained above US(t + 1) > US (t). To 
reduce the agreement gap, the new PO utility must satisfy 
UP(t+1) ≤ UP (t) and therefore the price step 
 ( / )o ap p Q    (1 / ' ')nQ n Q
(1 / ' ')nQ n Q
. After successive 
iterations the agreement price is reached and the optimum 
price is *  ( log( ) /op Q Q Q   / ) / 2o aQ . 
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